



FEDERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND 
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act drastically changed the financial regulatory land-
scape in the United States. One noteworthy change was a near-
elimination of the so-called “private adviser” exemption to the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940. The biggest beneficiaries of 
this exemption were private equity sponsors and hedge fund 
managers. A result of this change is that most private equity 
fund advisers and hedge fund managers must now register as 
investment advisers with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the “SEC”) under the Investment Advisers Act and are 
subject to a myriad of rules and regulations.  
 The focus of this Note is the application of the fiduciary 
duties governing advisers required to register under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act to private equity sponsors. Problematically, 
these fiduciary duties do not emanate from the Act itself, but 
are the result of judicial interpretation. Largely because of this 
genesis, the substance of advisers’ fiduciary duties remains un-
clear. Importantly for private equity advisers, the bounds of 
their fiduciary duties were developed in the context of indus-
tries vastly different from modern private equity. 
 This Note argues that the existing “one-size-fits-all” 
scheme of fiduciary regulation under the Investment Advisers 
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Act is inappropriate for the private equity industry. It exam-
ines three recent SEC orders against major industry players 
for violations of their fiduciary duties under the Investment 
Advisers Act and notes both their inconsistency and lack of 
guidance. Instead of this byzantine system of fiduciary regula-
tion, a contractarian model would better serve both private eq-
uity sponsors and investors by allowing the parties themselves 
to define the bounds of the fiduciary relationship. This ap-
proach best reflects the bargaining power and financial sophis-
tication of the parties and encourages the continued growth of 
the private equity industry.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Note focuses on the vague yet imperious fiduciary du-
ties owed by private equity sponsors to limited partners under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”). The uncer-
tainty around this fiduciary standard stems not from the text 
of the IAA itself, nor from the primary case interpreting duties 
owed under it, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,1 but 
from subsequent Supreme Court and appellate cases that fre-
quently relied on obtuse and untenable reasoning.2 This is in 
addition to the fact that private equity firms have only been 
subject to the IAA’s prescriptions since the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010,3 and thus have been subsumed into a 
regulatory structure largely built around cases decided before 
private equity entered the mainstream of American finance.4 
Yet, private equity firms face great consequences if they vio-
late their federal fiduciary duties. In the past few years, 
Blackstone and Apollo, two titans of the private equity indus-
try, paid $29 million and $40 million dollars, respectively, to 
settle with the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) to settle with the SEC 
after alleged violations of their fiduciary duties.5 
This Note argues that private equity advisers’ federal fidu-
ciary duties clash with the realities of the industry. Using Del-
 
1 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
2 See Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011). 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
4 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 180; see also Daniel O. Klier et al., The 
Changing Face of Private Equity: How Modern Private Equity Firms Man-
age Investment Portfolios, 12 J. PRIV. EQUITY 1, 7–13 (2009) (commenting on 
the “big rise” of the private equity industry in the 1980s). 
5 Apollo Mgmt. V, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 WL 
4497198 (Aug. 23, 2016); Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 4219, 2015 WL 5834037 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
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aware alternative entity law as a contrast, it poses and an-
swers three questions. First, how may the IAA’s non-waivable 
duties inhibit capital formation? Second, do the contours of 
the IAA’s fiduciary requirements fail to take into account the 
incentive structures that may be built into limited partner-
ship agreements? Third, is the federal fiduciary standard too 
vague to provide meaningful guidance to private equity spon-
sors, and has the wave of recent settlements provided any 
meaningful clarity? 
The answers to these questions reveal that the IAA’s fidu-
ciary duties, crafted via judicial fiat and SEC rulemaking, or-
ders, and administrative procedures, fail to provide meaning-
ful guidance and limit the economic potential of private equity 
sponsors. A more precise and realistic standard, or, in the al-
ternative, duties that are modifiable or waivable by the con-
tracting parties, will ensure that limited partners are ade-
quately protected while also accounting for the economic 
realities of these relationships. The highly sophisticated sig-
natories to limited partner agreements show little resem-
blance to the public investors that Justice Arthur Goldberg 
sought to protect in Capital Gains. The law ought to reflect 
that.     
A. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress passed the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the last of the New Deal se-
curities laws passed between 1933 and 1940.6 The IAA was a 
response to the SEC’s concerns with the investment adviser 
industry, such as “distinguishing bona fide investment coun-
sel from tipsters; conflicts of interest; contingent compensa-
tion tied to a percentage of profits; adviser custody of client 
 
6 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 88b-21 (2017)); Roberta S. 
Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers 
Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 406 
(2016). 
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assets and capitalization of the adviser entity; and assign-
ment of client relationships.”7 The IAA, as passed, required 
little more than for advisers to register with the SEC, and it 
was not until 1960 that Congress passed amendments that 
gave the Commission the authority to inspect the books and 
records of advisers, to prescribe book-keeping practices and 
records to keep, and to impose reporting requirements.8 These 
amendments emboldened the SEC to take action against 
those who violated the IAA’s antifraud provisions.9 Most im-
portantly for purposes of this Note, the SEC began to police 
violations of section 206.10 Section 206 of the IAA is a broadly 
worded anti-fraud provision.11 Section 206(1) prohibits “em-
ploy[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any cli-
ent”12 and section 206(2) prohibits an adviser from “en-
gag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates as a fraud upon any client.”13 
B. Development of a Federal Fiduciary Duty 
Three Supreme Court cases between 1963 and 1979 culmi-
nated in the imposition of a federal fiduciary duty on invest-
ment advisers under the IAA. In the first, SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Justice Goldberg, writing for the 
Court, held that the breach of an investment adviser’s fiduci-
ary duties under common law constituted fraud under section 
206 of the IAA.14 While some point to Capital Gains as the 
 
7 Karmel, supra note 6, at 407; see also Investment Advisory Services, 
H.R. Doc. No. 76-477 (1939). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2017) 
9 Karmel, supra note 6, at 410. 
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2017); Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Regulation by Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 
627, 630 (2008). 
11 Barbash & Massari, supra note 10, at 629–30. 
12 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2017). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2017). 
14 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196–197 
(1963). 
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case that established a federal fiduciary duty, others argue 
that the Court “neither stated nor implied that the Invest-
ment Advisers Act created a fiduciary duty governing advisers 
. . . [it] merely recognized that a fiduciary duty existed be-
tween advisers and their clients.”15 
The next significant decision in the development of a fed-
eral fiduciary duty under the IAA came in a case prosecuted 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”). In Santa Fe Industries v. Green, Justice Byron White 
opined in a footnote that “[a]lthough Capital Gains involved a 
federal securities statute, the Court’s references to fraud in 
the ‘equitable’ sense of the term were premised on its recogni-
tion that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to 
establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advis-
ers.”16 This served as part of his denial that section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act contained a fiduciary duty, as contrasted 
with, in his reasoning, section 206 of the IAA. In the 1979 
Transamerica case, when determining whether the IAA con-
tained a private right of action, the Court cited to Capital 
Gains and Santa Fe in declaring that section 206 “establishes 
‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of invest-
ment advisers.”17 From these three cases the federal fiduciary 
standard has been “firmly entrenched in the law,” appearing 
in “court decisions, SEC enforcement actions, and SEC admin-
istrative materials.”18 Professor Arthur Laby notes, “The prin-
ciple appears unassailable.”19 
 
15 Laby, supra note 2, at 1066. See also David Henry Disraeli, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8880,  Exchange Act Release No. 57027,  2007 WL 
9382543 (Dec. 21, 2007); Michael Flanagan, Release No. 160, 2000 WL 
98210 (ALJ Jan. 31, 2000) (supporting the proposition that Capital Gains 
recognized an existence of federal fiduciary duties). But see Barbash & Mas-
sari, supra note 10, at 632 n.29 (noting that the interpretation above “seems 
strained at best”). 
16 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977). 
17 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Harry Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 
17 (1979). 
18 Laby, supra note 2, at 1078. 
19 Id. 
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The SEC has vigorously enforced section 206 in the years 
since Transamerica, although its formulation of what consti-
tutes a breach of the federal fiduciary duty is anything but 
precise. For example, the federal fiduciary duty has been in-
terpreted to require “making full and adequate disclosure to 
clients regarding matters that may have an impact on the in-
vestment adviser’s independence and judgment.”20 This lan-
guage represents the inexactness of the disclosure duty. En-
forcement of the fiduciary duty has also focused on potential 
conflicts of interest.21 However, apart from the obligation to 
disclose conflicts, which is required by SEC rule, the parame-
ters of advisers’ federal fiduciary duties are unclear.22 
C. Private Equity and the Investment Advisers Act 
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, these federal fi-
duciary duties, however muddled, now apply to private equity 
advisers. Private equity advisers are usually legal entities lo-
cated within a private equity firm.23 A private equity firm is a 
group of investment professionals who raise money from a va-
riety of sources, including wealthy individuals and institu-
tional investors, and pool it into investment vehicles (private 
equity funds), primarily to invest in businesses.24 Most pri-
vate equity funds are structured as limited partnerships be-
cause this structure allows flexibility to “employ complex eco-
nomic arrangements while retaining the ‘pass-through’ tax 
 
20 THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PLAN-
NERS, 19 REG. FIN. PL. § 3:60, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (inter-
preting section 206 and Rule 206(4)-(8)). 
21 Id. 
22 Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2017). See also 
LEMKE & LINS, supra note 20, at § 2:30. 
23 SCOTT W. NAIDECH, PRACTICAL LAW CO., PRIVATE EQUITY FUND FOR-
MATION (2017), https://www.msaworldwide.com/Naidech_PrivateEqui-
tyFundFormation_Nov11.pdf [perma.cc/J5SN-7K5W]. 
24 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 122 (2013). 
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benefit.”25 The adviser within this structure is usually a lim-
ited liability company (“LLC”).26 This LLC is usually affiliated 
with another entity (usually a special purpose vehicle) that 
serves as the general partner in a private equity fund whose 
terms are governed by a limited partnership agreement 
(“LPA”).27 Within its LPAs, Blackstone, for instance, has es-
tablished Limited Partnership Advisory Committees 
(“LPACs”) consisting of a number of limited partners with the 
purpose of “review[ing] and approv[ing] or disapprov[ing] . . . 
any potential conflicts of interest in any transaction or rela-
tionship (including those relating to the receipt of certain 
fees).”28 This is common practice in the private equity indus-
try.29 
Private equity funds previously escaped regulation under 
the IAA via the private adviser exemption (the “Exemp-
tion”).30 This meant that they were not subject to the myriad 
 
25 Steve Ferrara, Student Comment, Developments in Banking and Fi-
nancial Law: VIII. Initial Public Offerings of Private Equity and Hedge 
Funds, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 334, 335 (2008). 
26 See, e.g., Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 4219, 2015 WL 5834037 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
27 NAIDECH, supra note 23, at 3. 
28 See Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4219, 2015 WL 5834037, at *4 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
29 See generally NAIDECH, supra note 23. The author of the Practical 
Law Practice Note refers to this as an “Investor Advisory Committee,” which 
serves the same function as an LPAC.   
30 Id. The author notes:  
Historically, many sponsors of private equity funds avoided 
registration with the SEC under the Advisers Act by relying 
on an exemption for investment advisers with fewer than 15 
clients (with each fund advised counting as only one client) 
and that do not hold themselves out to the public as invest-
ment advisers (often referred to as the private investment 
adviser exemption).  
Id. The exemptions for Investment Adviser registration were maintained 
but substantially narrowed by Dodd-Frank. See generally Summary of the 
Dodd-Frank Act: Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 2013 WL 4864429 (last 
updated 2018). 
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of regulations and requirements that come with being an in-
vestment adviser. However, as a response to the Bernie 
Madoff Ponzi scheme, Title IV of Dodd-Frank eliminated the 
Exemption,31 requiring advisers of private equity funds (and 
hedge funds) to register with the SEC, provided their assets 
under management are $150 million or greater.32 Thus, pri-
vate equity fund advisers registered under the IAA are now 
subject to what two scholars have called a “one-size-fits-all 
regulatory scheme” where the compliance costs often exceed 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.33 In line with the general 
obscurity of the IAA’s fiduciary duties outlined above, one au-
thor notes that “the precise contours of . . . federal fiduciary 
duties for . . . private equity advisers have remained ob-
scure.”34 Yet, since Dodd-Frank, the SEC has vigorously 
sought to hold private equity funds accountable for alleged vi-
olations of the IAA. 
Recent intense SEC scrutiny of private equity is reflected 
in a well-publicized 2014 speech at an industry conference by 
then-Director of the Office of Compliance Inspections and Ex-
aminations, Andrew J. Bowden.35 In his remarks, Bowden 
noted that “most limited partnership agreements do not pro-
vide limited partners with sufficient information rights to be 
able to adequately monitor not only their investments, but 
 
31 Joshua C. Dawson & Paul J. Foley, Square Pegs Don’t Fit in Round 
Holes: The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Elimination of the Private Fund 
Exemption on Private Equity Fund Advisers, 9 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 445, 445–
46 (2015). 
32 76 Fed. Reg. 71128-01 (Nov. 16, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 
275.204(b)–1 (2017)) . 
33 Dawson & Foley, supra note 31, at 452–53. 
34 Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and 
Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2015). 
35 See generally Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspec-
tions & Examinations, Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity (May 6, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014—spch05062014ab.html 
[perma.cc/J9VF-2566]. 
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also the operations of their manager.”36 He caused consterna-
tion amongst practitioners37 by remarking that in conducting 
examinations, his office had “identified what [they] believe[d] 
[were] violations of law or material weaknesses in controls 
over 50% of the time.”38  
Private equity advisers’ federal fiduciary duties should not 
be viewed in isolation. In practice, they are layered upon fidu-
ciary duties owed under state law.39 In limited partnerships, 
the dominant form of most private equity funds,40 the general 
partner—the fund sponsor—owes fiduciary duties to limited 
partners.41  The substantive requirements of the fiduciary du-
ties owed under Delaware law and under the federal standard 
trace their origin to Justice Benjamin Cardozo. In Meinhard 
v. Salmon, Cardozo articulated that business partners are 
“held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
 
36 Id. 
37 See LATHAM & WATKINS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGERS: TAKEA-
WAYS FROM THE SEC’S PAST YEAR IN ENFORCEMENT (2014), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-SEC-enforcement-focus-pri-
vate-equity [perma.cc/3KZY-PA9V] (“The ‘Spreading Sunshine’ speech pro-
vided an indicator—stating that the exam staff views marketing and valu-
ation as a key risk area . . . . Given the SEC’s aggressive posture and 
willingness to pursue enforcement investigations and actions in the private 
equity space, such proactive steps [such as re-evaluating performance dis-
closures] are appropriate.”). 
38 Bowden, supra note 35. 
39 This Note uses Delaware law for comparison because the majority of 
U.S. private equity funds are structured as Delaware LPs or Delaware 
LLCs. See generally Robert Schwartz, Delaware as a Location for Private 
Funds: The Why and the What, 18 World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 33 (Aug. 10, 
2012). 
40 Michael R. Pieczonka, The Largest Loophole in Federal Tax Law: 
Preferential Capital Gain Treatment for Private Equity and Hedge Fund 
Managers’ Carried Interests, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 529, 533 (2009). 
41 Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981) (“When 
the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act are read together, it is clear that the general partner in 
a limited partnership owes a fiduciary duty to the limited partners.”). 
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most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”42 Thus, to 
some extent, duties owed under both Delaware and federal 
law suffer from the murkiness of the common law. However, 
one glaring difference is that Delaware allows limited part-
ners to waive or modify those duties,43 while federal fiduciary 
duties are non-waivable and non-modifiable.44 Only by refer-
ence to this disparity can one launch a proper critique of the 
federal standard; by examining what the federal standard as 
applied to private equity could be, this Note argues the cur-
rent state of the law is unsustainable. 
II. DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
FIDUCIARY STANDARD AND DELAWARE LAW 
As noted above, the glaring difference between federal fi-
duciary duties and fiduciary duties under Delaware law is 
that the latter can be waived or modified by express agree-
ment of the parties. This seemingly simple concept has a 
plethora of consequences for how parties structure their con-
duct when entering into private equity arrangements. This 
Section examines how the SEC has applied the federal stand-
ard to private equity firms via settlements for alleged viola-
tions of the IAA, and contrasts those results with a regime 
where duties can be waived or modified. While the exact LPAs 
are closely guarded by private equity sponsors as “trade se-
crets,”45 the actual LPAs used in the funds subject to SEC ac-
tion are not essential to this analysis.46 Rather, what is im-
portant is when fiduciary duties are implicated, how the SEC 
 
42 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (West 2010). 
44 See Heitman Capital Mgmt., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 
789073, at *3 (Feb. 12, 2007). 
45 Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/business/retire-
ment/behind-private-equitys-curtain.html [perma.cc/FU72-FHX9]. 
46 In concert with the above article, the New York Times published a 
redacted version of a Carlyle LPA. See Redacted Carlyle Limited Partner-
ship Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/inter-
NADLER_FINAL   
No. 1:254]   FEDERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND PRIVATE EQUITY 265 
 
has substantiated its claims for a breach, and how a Dela-
ware-like regime would offer a result that is preferable, ex 
ante, for the contracting parties. 
A. SEC Enforcement Actions 
As a sample of relevant SEC enforcement actions, this Sec-
tion focuses on three major settlements between the SEC and 
affiliates of Apollo,47 Blackstone,48 and KKR. According to Pri-
vate Equity International, an industry publication, these en-
tities are three of the seven largest private equity groups in 
the world.49 These settlements do not reflect the totality of 
settlements with the SEC by private equity advisers, nor are 
they meant to be representative of all such settlements. They 
do, however, give examples of the types of conduct that the 
SEC has focused on in its enforcement capacity, and the types 
 
active/2014/10/18/business/19equity-doc.html [perma.cc/ZQ8R-ZYAT]. Fur-
thermore, in 2014 the website “Naked Capitalism” published twelve LPAs 
that it obtained via the Pennsylvania Treasury’s public e-contracts website. 
See Yves Smith, The Private Equity Limited Partnership Agreement Release, 
NAKED CAPITALISM (May 26, 2014), http://www.nakedcapital-
ism.com/2014/05/private-equity-limited-partnership-agreement-release-in-
dustrys-snowden-moment.html [perma.cc/2CM7-36T3]. The effort was a di-
rect response to a Wall Street Journal Report detailing practices by 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (“KKR”) that were later subject to an SEC 
enforcement action. See Mark Maremont, KKR Error Raises Question: What 
Cash Should Go to Investors?, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-error-raises-a-question-what-cash-
should-go-to-investors-1400714830. This information is provided for the in-
quisitive reader but the released LPAs are not examined in this Note. Ra-
ther than providing a line-by-line analysis of specific LPAs, this Note takes 
a broad view when examining the differences between federal and Delaware 
law.   
47 Apollo Mgmt. V, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 
WL 4497198 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
48 Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
4219, 2015 WL 5834037 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
49 Private Equity International, PEI300, https://www.privateequityin-
ternational.com/pei/pei300/ [perma.cc/8HRC-SAAS]. According to PEI, 
Blackstone is the largest private equity group, KKR is second-largest, and 
Apollo is seventh-largest. 
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of behavior the SEC believes constitute violations of the fed-
eral fiduciary duty.    
1. KKR 
KKR allegedly violated its federal fiduciary duty to its lim-
ited partners by misallocating broken deal expenses. The 
source of this alleged violation was a failure to allocate ex-
penses to co-investors, who would sometimes fund acquisi-
tions alongside KKR’s flagship fund.50 For all KKR transac-
tions, the LPAs reserve a percentage of fund portfolio 
investments for third parties including KKR executives, con-
sultants, and others.51 KKR establishes co-investment vehi-
cles for these third parties to make these investments.52 The 
relevant LPA for this enforcement action reserved up to 5% of 
every portfolio investment for KKR executives and up to 2.5% 
for certain consultants and others.53 These vehicles invested 
on a deal-by-deal basis with no specified committed capital. 
Furthermore, KKR “sponsored a publicly traded partnership 
that it established and managed independently of any specific 
private equity transactions.”54 This partnership was offered 
co-investment opportunities from 2006 to 2008.55 The SEC la-
beled the vehicles as well as the publicly traded partnership 
as the “KKR Co-Investors.”56 
The KKR action focused on broken deal expenses incurred 
in sourcing potential investment opportunities that were 
never consummated. These expenses included “research costs, 
travel costs and professional fees, and other expenses” for 
deals that do not materialize.57 When a deal is consummated, 
 
50 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
4131, 2015 WL 3941621, at *1 (June 29, 2015). 






57 Id. at *4. 
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the new portfolio company reimburses KKR for expenses. 
However, when a deal does not occur, it is industry practice 
for the fund (including limited partnership contributions) to 
reimburse the fund sponsor for these expenses. Consistent 
with this practice, the relevant LPA required “the fund to pay 
‘all’ broken deal expenses ‘incurred by or on behalf of’ the fund 
‘in developing, negotiating and structuring prospective or po-
tential [i]nvestments that are not ultimately made.’”58 KKR 
itself bore 20% of broken deal expenses, whereas the fund bore 
80% of broken deal expenses and the KKR Co-Investors bore 
none of these expenses.59 After an internal review and a re-
view by a third-party consultant, KKR revised its expense al-
location methodology effective January 1, 2012 to allocate a 
share of broken deal expenses to the KKR Co-Investors. The 
new methodology considered a number of factors, including 
“the amount of committed capital, the amount of invested cap-
ital, and the percentage of transactions in which KKR CoIn-
vestors [sic] were eligible to participate given the Flagship PE 
Funds’ minimum investment rights.”60 
The SEC targeted KKR’s broken deal expense allocation 
from before KKR adopted its new policy. The Commission 
noted that KKR “did not allocate any share of broken deal ex-
penses to KKR Co-Investors . . . for the relevant period even 
though KKR Co-Investors participated in and benefited from 
KKR’s general sourcing of transactions.”61 It charged that 
KKR did not “expressly disclose in the LPAs or related offer-
ing materials that it did not allocate or attribute any broken 
deal expenses to KKR Co-Investors.”62  “As a result of the ab-
sence of such disclosure,” the order reads, “KKR misallocated 
$17.4 million in broken deal expenses . . . and, thus, breached 
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The SEC premised liability on section 206(2) of the IAA, 
which prohibits an investment adviser from engaging “in any 
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as 
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”64 The 
SEC referred to Steadman and Capital Gains when asserting 
“[a] violation of Section 206(2) may rest on a finding of simple 
negligence.”65 This is the only citation to case law in the order, 
and without further elaboration, KKR agreed to pay a $10 mil-
lion civil monetary penalty as well as reimburse the fund for 
$14,165,968 plus interest.66   
2. Blackstone 
The SEC instituted an enforcement action against Black-
stone and its affiliate entities for failing to disclose accelerated 
monitoring fees as well as failing to disclose a discount on le-
gal services negotiated as part of a single legal services ar-
rangement for itself and the funds.67 
Accelerated monitoring fees (paid to Blackstone) reflect the 
foregone future revenues of a private equity sponsor when it 
sells or takes public a portfolio company. For each portfolio 
company owned by a Blackstone-advised fund, Blackstone 
generally enters into monitoring agreements with that com-
pany to provide consulting and advisory services in exchange 
for a fee.68 This practice “is disclosed and authorized in vari-
ous pre-commitment fund documents, including private place-
ment memoranda, LPAs, and investment advisory agree-
ments.”69 Blackstone’s monitoring agreements provided for 
the acceleration of monitoring fees upon the sale or initial pub-
lic offering (“IPO”) of a portfolio company before the expiration 
 
64 Id. at *6. 
65 Id. (citing SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). 
66 Id. at *6, *8. 
67 Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
4219, 2015 WL 5834037, at *1 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
68 Id. at *3. 
69 Id. 
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of the monitoring agreement (typically ten years).70 Thus, 
Blackstone could terminate the agreement and demand a pre-
sent value lump sum payment. The SEC claimed that “the net 
amount of the payments . . . reduced the value of the Funds’ 
assets (i.e., the portfolio companies making the accelerated 
monitoring payments) when sold or taken public, thereby re-
ducing the amounts available for distribution to limited part-
ners.”71 
The SEC noted that while Blackstone disclosed its ability 
to take monitoring fees (i.e. enter into monitoring agreements 
to provide services to portfolio companies), “it did not disclose 
to the Funds, the Funds’ LPAC, or the Funds’ limited partners 
its practice of accelerating monitoring fees until after Black-
stone had taken accelerated fees.”72 “By the time [these] dis-
closures were made, the limited partners had already commit-
ted capital to the Funds and the accelerated fees had already 
been paid.”73 The SEC conceded that “[t]he LPAC of each 
Fund could have objected and arbitrated over the accelerated 
monitoring fees after they had been taken, but never did.”74 
However, the Commission also concluded that because Black-
stone had a conflict of interest as the recipient of the fees, it 
“could not effectively consent to the practice on behalf of the 
Funds.”75 
In addition to the acceleration of monitoring fees, the SEC 
took issue with Blackstone’s legal services arrangement. 
Blackstone entered into a legal services arrangement on be-
half of itself and its funds, where Blackstone received a dis-




72 Id. at *4. 
73 Id. 
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the discount received by the funds.76 Blackstone did not dis-
close the disparate discounts between 2008 through early 
2011 to the funds, the funds’ LPAC, or the funds’ limited part-
ners. The SEC contended that Blackstone had a conflict of in-
terest as the beneficiary of the fee discount and thus “could 
not effectively consent to the practice on behalf of the 
Funds.”77 
Using identical language as in the KKR settlement, the 
SEC ordered that Blackstone violated section 206(2) of the 
IAA by “engaging ‘in [a] transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client 
or prospective client.’”78 In addition, the SEC stated that 
Blackstone violated section 206(4) of the Advisers Act (and 
Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder), which makes it unlawful for an in-
vestment adviser:  
[T]o ‘[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact 
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances un-
der which they were made, not misleading, to any in-
vestor or prospective investor in the pooled invest-
ment vehicle’ or ‘engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive with respect to any investor or prospective inves-
tor in the pooled investment vehicle.’79  
Blackstone agreed to pay a civil penalty of $10 million 
along with $26,225,203 in disgorgement interest.80 
3. Apollo 
The SEC ordered that Apollo Management (“Apollo”) 
breached its fiduciary duty to its limited partners by acceler-




78 Id. at *5. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at *6, *8. 
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accrued interest.81 The findings concerning acceleration of 
monitoring fees by Apollo are similar to those in the Black-
stone order, and the orders use identical language in some 
passages.82 
Furthermore, the SEC ordered that Apollo breached its fi-
duciary duty by failing to disclose material information con-
cerning a fund loan. In June 2008, Advisors VI, the general 
partner to Fund VI, entered into a loan agreement with Fund 
VI and four other funds. The purpose of the loan was to defer 
taxes that Advisors VI would owe on carried interest.83 The 
loan agreement required the general partner to pay interest 
to the funds during the course of the loan, and this interest 
was reflected in the funds’ financial statements as an asset of 
the funds. However, the accrued interest was ultimately allo-
cated solely to the capital account of Advisors VI and not to 
the lending funds.84 
 
81 Apollo Mgmt. V, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 
WL 4497198 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
82  Compare id. to Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 4219, 2015 WL 5834037, at *3–4 (both noting the accelera-
tion of monitoring fees and inadequate disclosure to the Funds, the Funds’ 
LPAC, and the limited partners). 
83 See id. David A. Weisbach offers an apt description of carried inter-
est:  
A carried or profits interest in a partnership is a right to a 
share of the profits separate from an interest in the assets 
or capital of the partnership. For example, if a partnership 
has $1,000 of capital and earns $100, a 15% carried interest 
would give the holder the right to 15% of the $100 profits 
and none of the $1,000 of capital. A capital interest gives the 
holder the right to both profits and capital. A 15% capital 
interest in the same partnership would be entitled to both 
15% of the $100 profits and of the $1,000 capital. Carried 
interests and profits interests are effectively the same thing 
and I will use the terms interchangeably. 
David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 
VA. L. REV. 715, 716 n.1 (2008). 
84 Apollo Mgmt. V, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 
WL 4497198 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
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Similar to the KKR and Blackstone orders, the SEC deter-
mined Apollo violated section 206(2) of the Advisers Act.85 
Furthermore, like the Blackstone order, the SEC found the 
lack of disclosure violated section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 
thereunder.86 The SEC used identical language to premise li-
ability as in the other orders. Apollo was also found to have 
failed to reasonably supervise a former partner’s expense re-
imbursement practices and to implement policies reasonably 
designed to prevent violations of the IAA and its Rules.87 Al-
together, Apollo was ordered to pay a $12.5 million civil pen-
alty and $37,527,000 in disgorgement plus interest.88 
4. Takeaways from SEC Enforcement Actions 
The three SEC orders detailed above leave much to be de-
sired from an ex ante perspective. The orders fail to identify 
which violations constitute which infractions. For instance, all 
three firms admitted to engaging in a “transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit” un-
der section 206(2).89 The firms also violated section 206(4) pro-
hibiting an investment advisor to “[m]ake any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary to make the statements made.”90 Problematically, 
the SEC orders never delineate the difference between non-
disclosure and fraud.   
The SEC also failed to assign any weight to its finding in 
the Blackstone order that, because the accelerated fees were 
disclosed after they were taken, the LPAC could have chal-
lenged the fees but never did. It is possible that not disclosing 
from the outset the practice of accelerating monitoring fees is 
enough to violate section 206(4), but it is also possible that 






89 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2017). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2017). 
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could imagine a spirited argument on this point, yet the order 
fails to articulate a standard of disclosure. If, on the other 
hand, failure to disclose that the adviser could accelerate mon-
itoring fees is fraudulent, the LPAC’s ability to challenge fees 
is material. The existence of the LPAC may constitute an im-
plicit agreement between the parties that Blackstone has wide 
latitude to charge all kinds of fees, which the LPAC then has 
the ability to challenge.   
These orders raise more questions than they answer, yet 
there are several concrete takeaways from this triad. First is 
a firm notion, however vague, that the federal fiduciary stand-
ard requires full disclosure to limited partners by an Invest-
ment Adviser. Although the SEC does not make clear whether 
that disclosure falls under section 206(2) or section 206(4), it 
is clear that the SEC has made disclosure a priority. The sec-
ond takeaway is that the SEC does not, for the most part, con-
sider the parties’ expectations in determining whether a spe-
cific action was a violation of a partner’s federal fiduciary 
duty. Even though, in the SEC’s words, “a violation of Section 
206(2) of the Advisers Act may rest on a finding of simple neg-
ligence,”91 there is no reference to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties. This has essentially created a strict liability 
rule. 
The many questions these orders leave open reflect the un-
certainties of practitioners who work with the applicable IAA 
provisions. As one author notes, “[S]ome practitioners believe 
that section 206 essentially imposes a disclosure requirement 
on advisers . . . . Followers of this interpretation believe that 
the fundamental duty imposed by section 206 is to make full 
and fair disclosure to clients.”92 Another camp views section 
206 as “imposing substantive regulatory requirements on ad-
visers in addition to disclosure obligations.”93 Under this view, 
“making full disclosure or obtaining client consent may not, 
 
91 Apollo Mgmt. V, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4493, 2016 
WL 4497198 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
92 LEMKE & LINS, supra note 20, at § 2:30. 
93 Id. 
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by itself, be sufficient to insulate an adviser from liability if 
the adviser is not acting in the best interests of clients con-
sistent with its fiduciary obligation.”94 These orders seem to 
straddle both interpretations. If the federal fiduciary stand-
ard merely consists of a full disclosure requirement, then lo-
cating it within section 206(2) or 206(4) is not particularly dif-
ficult. However, the second interpretation is much more 
concerning. As noted above, Blackstone did disclose the accel-
eration of monitoring fees after it took those fees.95 The second 
interpretation is inherently complex yet the orders cited above 
are bereft of nuance. 
It is essential to understand the significance of these un-
certainties: Private equity sponsors are now subject to the 
IAA. Even with little guidance from the SEC, private equity 
firms must still structure their conduct to conform with the 
law to avoid facing sanction. Turning to case law also provides 
little clarity. In Steadman v. S.E.C., the Fifth Circuit held that 
the federal fiduciary duty for advisers does not include all 
breaches of fiduciary obligation.96 The Court noted that “we 
do not think this overall purpose [of the IAA] is a warrant to 
read sections 206(1) and (2) of the IAA . . . as the vehicle to 
reach all breaches of fiduciary trust . . . . The Commission may 
impose sanctions only for violations of the statutes assigned 
to its jurisdiction . . . .”97 This holding does nothing but beg 
the question of what exactly constitutes a violation of the 
standard. One may try to remedy this murkiness by referenc-
ing fiduciary requirements under state common law. How-
ever, Professor Arthur Laby notes that the Fifth Circuit in a 
1990 decision98 conveyed that the federal standard is “not as 
far-reaching as the state common law of fiduciary obligation,” 
whereas Santa Fe can be read to condone “a federal fiduciary 
 
94 Id. 
95 Blackstone Mgmt. Partners, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
4219, 2015 WL 5834037 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
96 See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1142 (5th Cir. 1979). 
97 Id. 
98 Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 831–32 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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duty . . . broader than state law because of the quest for uni-
formity.”99   
5. Impacts of Dodd-Frank and SEC Enforcement 
Actions 
As noted above, the SEC’s approach to policing private eq-
uity sponsors’ conduct under the IAA’s fiduciary duties is 
problematic because it fails to give meaningful guidance for 
future conduct or to appreciate the sophistication of the con-
tracting parties. But enforcement reverberates far outside of 
those limited circumstances in which the SEC has or may 
choose to pursue an action. In fact, the application of the IAA 
to the private equity industry has the potential to significantly 
affect the economy of the United States. 
Much of IAA fiduciary enforcement both in the private eq-
uity context and others has focused on the issue of disclosure. 
Disclosure is a cornerstone of federal securities laws because 
it “best equips investors to make sound, rational investment 
decisions.”100 Furthermore, because most experts agree that 
markets conform to the semi-strong capital markets hypothe-
sis,101 meaning that prices of securities reflect all publicly 
available information,102 the more information that is dis-
closed, the closer valuations will reflect reality. In the private 
equity context, anything not disclosed before Dodd-Frank 
would presumably drive up internal rate of return (“IRR”) be-
cause sponsors have an incentive to disclose all information 
that would decrease investors’ required return. Because pri-
vate equity investors are sophisticated, however, they may 
have already factored the possibility that undisclosed infor-
mation exists that would increase the required IRR. In this 
 
99 Laby, supra note 2, at 1094. 
100 Michael A. Kitson, Controversial Orthodoxy: The Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis and Loss Causation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 191, 
198 (2012). 
101 See id. at 195. 
102 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970). 
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scenario, fiduciary protections would lower the required re-
turns, encouraging a flow of funds into private equity and 
from there into the economy at large.103 
Dodd-Frank’s impact on the private equity industry is a 
matter of debate. In written testimony to the House Commit-
tee on Financial Services in 2016, Daniel M. Gallagher, a for-
mer SEC Commissioner, noted that Dodd-Frank compliance 
“impose[s] significant costs and burdens” that “threaten the 
ability of certain funds . . . to promote capital formation 
through investments in operating companies.”104 However, in 
a survey covering the private funds industry, Wulf Kaal found 
that “[t]he long-term impact of the evolving post Dodd-Frank 
Act regulatory landscape appears to be much less intense than 
the industry initially anticipated” and “[t]he costs of compli-
ance associated with the Dodd-Frank Act are . . . largely man-
ageable.”105 
Kaal’s assurances that Dodd-Frank will not have a long-
term impact on private equity respond to the bulk of the crit-
icism of IAA application to the industry. Remarking on the 
inapplicability of SEC rules to private equity funds, two schol-
ars lament at the costs and time associated with complying 
with recordkeeping requirements, trade error requirements, 
the SEC’s custody rule, and others.106 But bemoaning rela-
tively minor expenses, as much of the scholarship has done to 
 
103 This conclusion follows from one of two scenarios. Either fiduciary 
protections cause funds to stop bad conduct, creating better returns for in-
vestors, or sponsors were not engaging in bad conduct to start with, and 
investors, now confident of this, can lower their required return because 
they no longer must factor in the possibility that they are losing return to 
sponsor shenanigans.   
104 Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation, Transparency, 
and Regulatory Accountability Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th 
Cong. 19 (2016) (testimony of Daniel M. Gallagher, President, Patomak 
Global Partners LLC) [hereinafter Gallagher Testimony]. 
105 Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years After the Dodd-
Frank Act, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 624, 631 (2016). 
106 Dawson & Foley, supra note 31, at 454–57. 
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this point,107 misses the boat on why the IAA’s application to 
private equity is concerning.  
Instead, the focus should be on how the IAA’s fiduciary pro-
tections may inhibit capital formation. If, as Gallagher sug-
gests, the new costs stemming from the IAA are “not likely to 
yield materially enhanced protections for the private funds’ 
investors,”108 yet they drive up a firm’s required IRR, making 
it harder to survive and succeed, the IAA could limit the flow 
of funds into the industry. This has a direct impact on the 
broader economy. About 4600 U.S. private equity firms own 
equity in approximately 30,000 American businesses.109 
These companies employ around 11.3 million employees.110 
This issue is important not only because it is philosophically 
dubious for the SEC to be policing the conduct of sophisticated 
parties with large amounts of bargaining power, but because 
over-enforcement could stifle the industry’s growth.   
The purpose of this Section has not been to fully articulate 
what the federal fiduciary standard is or what it should be. 
Rather, it has been to provide examples of how the SEC has 
applied the standard in the private equity context and what 
questions and consequences arise from those applications. 
The scope of this uncertainty is impossible to grasp without 
reference to an alternative regime. Thus, an examination of 
the fiduciary standard for general partners under Delaware 
law follows. 
 
107 See, e.g., id.; Shipra Mehta, Continuing Conundrum of Mistakes: 
Where the Dodd-Frank Act Went Wrong, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 233 
(2015). 
108 Gallagher Testimony, supra note 104, at 19–20. 
109 Private Equity: Top States & Districts, AM. INV. COUNCIL, 
http://www.investmentcouncil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/pri-
vate-equity-top-states-districts/[perma.cc/LM4G-94GQ]. 
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B. Fiduciary Duties Under Delaware Law 
In contrast to the IAA’s fiduciary regime, the fiduciary du-
ties owed to limited partners are waivable and modifiable by 
the parties under Delaware law. This Section surveys the 
source of this flexibility and the reasons for this state of affairs 
in Delaware. Then, it examines Delaware law in light of the 
KKR, Blackstone, and Apollo orders. 
1. DLPA and Waivable Fiduciary Duties 
In 2004, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware 
Limited Partnership Act to allow for the waiver or modifica-
tion of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships.111 This 
amendment was accompanied by another that allowed for the 
same waiver or modification in Limited Liability Companies 
(“LLCs”).112 Former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, Myron T. Steele, noted that it was “abundantly clear” 
that Delaware had changed the status of the parties to LLCs 
or limited partnerships from a “dependency relationship” to a 
“contractual relationship.”113 As part of this contractual rela-
tionship, according to Chief Justice Steele, “except where the 
parties to an LLP or LLC agreement do not address fiduciary 
duties, parties to limited partnership and limited liability 
 
111 74 Del. Laws Ch. 265 (2004). The current version reads: 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other 
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
partnership or to another partner or to another person that 
is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agree-
ment, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be ex-
panded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the part-
nership agreement; provided that the partnership 
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (West 2011). 
112 74 Del. Laws Ch. 275 (2004). 
113 Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1, 13–14 (2007). 
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company agreements will normally seek to craft their own sta-
tus relationship by contract.”114 Thus, when parties move to 
modify or eliminate fiduciary duties, “the courts must recog-
nize that the contracting parties have not superimposed upon 
their relationship a set of duties and liabilities drawn from a 
common law fiduciary duty with its complex overlay of levels 
of scrutiny.”115 
It is clear from the statute and subsequent case law that 
even if fiduciary duties are waived or modified, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an independent pro-
tection. In Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC,116 a 
limited partnership agreement had replaced the default fidu-
ciary duties with a good faith standard. The Chancery Court 
dismissed a claim under the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing because the challenged transactions were ap-
proved in accordance with the governing document, and thus 
had a conclusive presumption of good faith.117 The Delaware 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the limited partnership 
agreement’s “conclusive presumption of good faith” did not 
“bar a claim under the implied covenant.”118 The court found 
that a party could adequately plead a claim under the implied 
covenant by alleging a “manifestly unfair transaction” with 
“the type of arbitrary, unreasonable conduct that the implied 
covenant prohibits.”119 
 
114 Id. at 23. 
115 Id. 
116 Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 2013).   
117 Id. at 410. (“[A] provision created four ‘safe harbors’ within which 
the general partner and its ‘Affiliates’ could effectuate a conflict of interest 
transaction free of any claim that they breached ‘any duty stated or implied 
by law or equity’ . . . . The first of those four enumerated safe harbors—
‘Special Approval’ is implicated in this case.”). 
118 Id. at 418. 
119 Id. at 422. The Gerber court adopted the definition of the implied 
covenant from a Chancery decision, ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. 
Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC. That decision in part reads: 
“The implied covenant requires that a party refrain from arbitrary or un-
reasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the 
contract from receiving the fruits of its bargain.” 50 A.3d 434, 440–42 (Del. 
NADLER_FINAL  
280 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
 
This fiduciary regime is obviously quite different from the 
standard for investment advisers under federal law. Most 
glaringly, the source of a claim for breach is the express agree-
ment of the parties (or the default duties if the parties do not 
contractually modify fiduciary duties)120 rather than a bewil-
dering body of case law with limited applicability to the 
unique realities of the private equity industry. 
III. THE FIDUCIARY PROTECTIONS IN THE 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT AS APPLIED TO 
PRIVATE EQUITY SPONSORS SHOULD BE 
MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE DELAWARE 
CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH 
A. Delaware’s Approach Is More Favorable 
There are many reasons to favor Delaware’s contractarian 
approach over the mandatory and non-modifiable fiduciary 
duties owed under the IAA. A long-time advocate for Dela-
ware’s so-called contractarian approach in both the corporate 
and alternative entity context was Professor Larry Rib-
stein.121 Ribstein remarked that “[f]iduciary duties should be 
broadly waivable in partnerships and other unincorporated 
firms. Because the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties vary 
 
Ch. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 
2013). 
120 There is still some debate as to whether default duties exist in lim-
ited partnerships, though the Chancery has held numerous times that de-
fault duties apply. For a discussion of this topic, see Michael Despres, Alter-
native Entities and Fiduciary Duty Waivers in Delaware, 2015 BYU L. REV. 
1347, 1354–57 (2015). 
121 Professor Ribstein coined the phrase “uncorporation” to refer to lim-
ited partnerships and LLCs. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and 
Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131 (2009). Debates have per-
sisted about the modification and waiver of fiduciary duties both in the cor-
porate and “uncorporate” context. For obvious reasons, fiduciary duties in 
corporations will not be discussed here. 
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from firm to firm, these duties must be varied to suit the par-
ticular relationship.”122 Consistent with Delaware’s current 
approach, Ribstein advocated that parties should be able to 
alter fiduciary duties in their agreements as long as they are 
held to “good faith compliance with their contracts.”123 Not 
only is it advantageous to tailor the duties in a particular en-
tity to the expectations and needs of the parties, but a strict 
application of fiduciary duties to alternative entities like lim-
ited partnerships leaves much to be desired from a stability 
and predictability perspective. One author notes that the “un-
predictability resulting from the potential application of tra-
ditional ‘corporate’ fiduciary duties to an LLC agreement may 
add costs and inefficiencies . . . . Legal uncertainty compli-
cates business planning, promotes costly litigation, and un-
duly impedes managerial discretion.”124 
The considerations favoring a contractarian approach ap-
ply even more so in a private equity context. A contractarian 
approach enables parties to align incentive structures to best 
suit their needs. The “one-size-fits-all” approach embodied by 
the SEC’s enforcement of federal fiduciary standards fails to 
take into account the intricate and heavily negotiated legal 
relationships found in LPAs. Furthermore, a contractarian 
approach allows general partners (here, the firms themselves 
or their affiliates) to structure their conduct in a way that is 
within the letter and the spirit of the express agreement of the 
parties. This setup would be simpler in an alternative regime 
because the parties themselves would define the scope of their 
duties. 
 
122 Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated 
Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 594 (1997). 
123 Id. 
124 Paul M. Altman, Elisa Erlenbach Maas & Michael P. Maxwell, 
Eliminating Fiduciary Duty Uncertainty: The Benefits of Effectively Modify-
ing Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLC Agreements, AM. BAR ASS’N: BUS. LAW 
TODAY (Feb. 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/publica-
tions/blt/2013/02/05_altman.html [perma.cc/A476-LZF4]. 
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B. Incentive Structures in Private Equity 
A few basic reasons exist for fiduciary duties in a private 
equity structure to be modifiable by the parties. For example, 
private equity funds are frequently managed by managers 
who oversee more than one fund; thus, a manager who is un-
able to obtain a modification of their fiduciary duties could be 
potentially liable for breach of the duty of loyalty.125 The SEC 
orders themselves, as well as third party commentators, note 
that in enforcing section 206, the SEC focuses on conflicts of 
interest. It is consequently within the realm of possibility that 
simply managing two funds could expose an adviser to liabil-
ity under the IAA.126 Second is the basic concern about legal 
liability for actions taken by the adviser as an impediment to 
mutually desirable business decisions. This same rationale is 
reflected in the Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”). 
DGCL section 102(b)(7) permits a corporation to waive the fi-
duciary duty of care for corporate directors and officers.127 One 
scholar notes that this provision “allows the marketplace—ra-
ther than mandatory rules—to determine the extent to which 
corporate directors must take personal risks when they agree 
to make decisions on behalf of corporations and sharehold-
ers.”128 Thus, federal fiduciary duties, like those imposed 
through Delaware law, can change the incentives to act or em-
bark on certain business endeavors that, ex ante, both general 
partners and limited partners want to pursue. 
A contractarian approach could better take into account 
possible incentive structures in private equity arrangements. 
A close reading of the KKR order demonstrates that the SEC 
may have erroneously characterized KKR’s intended incentive 
 
125 Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties 
and Contractual Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 
295, 306 (2014). 
126 See Platt, supra note 34, at 26–27. 
127 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2017).  
128 David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corpo-
rate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 507 
(2004). 
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structure as a violation of fiduciary duty. Recall that the SEC 
found that KKR violated its federal fiduciary duties by not al-
locating a share of “broken deal expenses” to Co-Investors that 
included its own employees as well as consultants and oth-
ers.129 There is a distinct possibility that the Co-Investment 
structure, paired with the non-allocation of “broken deal ex-
penses” to the Co-Investors, is a deliberate incentive structure 
designed to ensure that employees and consultants will not 
limit their research because of cost. Thus, if a KKR employee 
was attempting to source deals, but would also pay a pro-rata 
share of the expenses for any deal that was not successful, 
they may decline to exhaustively search for the optimal deal 
for the limited partners. The disgorgement amount from the 
KKR settlement was $14,165,968 and the funds at issue in the 
order (KKR’s flagship funds) invested $30.2 billion over the 
period covered by the order.130 Thus, the unallocated broken 
deal expenses accounted for 0.04% of the total amount in-
vested by the fund over this period.131 For reference, KKR’s 
2006 Fund L.P., which was the largest and most active fund 
during the time period covered by the order,132 has a net IRR 
of 7.6%.133 It is possible, and even probable, that limited part-
ners are willing to sacrifice the 0.04% of their investment over 
 
129 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 4131, 2015 WL 3941621, at *3–6 (June 29, 2015). 
130 Id. at 4, 6. 
131 Calculated as $14,165,968 / $30,200,000,000 * 100 = 0.0469%. 
132 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 4131, 2015 WL 3941621, at *1 (June 29, 2015). At the time of the order, 
the 2006 fund had invested more than $17 billion into forty-two portfolio 
companies. 
133 Private Equity Program Fund Performance Review, CALPERS, 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/asset-classes/private-eq-
uity/pep-fund-performance [perma.cc/WP5U-VBDX]. Net IRR is the “net in-
ternal rate of return (Net IRR) is a measure of a portfolio or fund’s perfor-
mance that is equal to the internal rate of return (IRR) after management 
fees and carried interest have been accounted for. It is a capital budgeting 
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the span of six years in order to increase the incentive for KKR 
and its employees and consultants to source the most desira-
ble deals. This conclusion is supported by the cited text of the 
LPA, which required “the fund to pay ‘all’ broken deal ex-
penses ‘incurred by or on behalf of’ the fund ‘in developing, 
negotiating and structuring prospective or potential [i]nvest-
ments that are not ultimately made.’”134 This was in the LPA 
along with the reservation of a certain percentage for Co-In-
vestors; it was evident to any limited partner that Co-Inves-
tors could invest, yet the fund would pay broken deal ex-
penses. However, the possibility that this was a purposeful 
incentive structure is outright ignored by the SEC. A contrac-
tarian model in which the parties could waive the federal fi-
duciary duties could remedy this problem and signify that the 
limited partners consented to what the SEC may define as a 
breach of duty. 
The Blackstone and Apollo orders contain a similar possi-
ble incentive that the SEC ignores. The Blackstone order 
notes that “[w]hile Blackstone disclosed its ability to collect 
monitoring fees to the Funds and to the Funds’ limited part-
ners prior to their commitment of capital, it did not disclose 
. . . its practice of accelerating monitoring fees until after 
Blackstone had taken accelerated fees.”135 One could argue 
that this is a false dichotomy between charging monitoring 
fees and accelerating those fees, and that the existence of the 
LPAC allowed the limited partners to challenge how Black-
stone was taking those fees. Furthermore, the practice of tak-
ing accelerated monitoring fees could be an incentive struc-
ture to encourage the fund managers to maximize the value of 
the fund. Once one of its funds has been invested in a portfolio 
company, Blackstone has an incentive for the fund to continue 
to hold the company, since it receives monitoring fees as a 
 
134 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 4131, 2015 WL 3941621, at *4 (June 29, 2015) (emphasis added). 
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source of revenue. The practice of accelerating fees could en-
courage Blackstone to sell or take public a company when it 
may be in their own best interests to continue to collect the 
fees. By allowing acceleration, and thus compensating Black-
stone for the present value of future fees, it removes the in-
centive for Blackstone, as fund manager, to hold a company 
past the point where doing so is in the best interests of the 
limited partners. A contractarian approach would prevent 
SEC enforcement in this case, because the parties would be 
able to specify whether this qualifies as a true “conflict of in-
terest,” a focal point of SEC enforcement of the Advisers Act, 
or whether acceleration of fees is contemplated in the relation-
ship. 
C. Limitations of This Argument 
This argument—that enforcement of federal fiduciary du-
ties on private equity advisers should follow a contractarian 
approach—has obvious limitations. Robert Goddard summa-
rized the concept behind the contractarian approach: “At a 
prescriptive, normative level, it provides a conceptual frame-
work capable of resisting state intervention, and one in which 
the state’s role is dual: first, to provide an appropriate mech-
anism for bargain enforcement; and, secondly, to provide a 
framework within which bargaining is made more effi-
cient.”136 Admittedly, it appears inconsistent to advocate a 
model for federal government enforcement based on a theory 
which is meant to limit the amount of government interven-
tion in business relationships. The House Report accompany-
ing the IAA stated: “The essential purpose of [the IAA] is to 
protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of 
unscrupulous tipsters.”137 It conflicts with the purposes of the 
IAA for the SEC to step back and allow the parties, rather 
than the agency charged with administering the statute, to 
determine the bounds of the agency’s enforcement power.  
 
136 Robert Goddard, Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-
461 of the Companies Act 1985, 20 CO. LAW. 66, 67 (1999). 
137 H.R. Rep. No. 76-2639, at 28 (1940). 
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Yet, the SEC can and should adopt an approach that takes 
into account the fact that enforcement of this federal fiduciary 
standard is new to the private equity industry. Business con-
duct that may be nefarious in one industry may be acceptable 
in others, yet the orders to this point have shown no nuance 
or legal analysis of the issues. This is partially due to the 
method of enforcement, orders with settlements, which does 
not allow the legal issues to be litigated and debated on their 
merits. Yet, without a more nuanced debate, the SEC will re-
main able to cite one case that is part of an extremely confus-
ing line of doctrine in imposing seven-figure fines. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While in no way exhaustive, this Note has attempted to 
expose a problem with SEC enforcement of the federal fiduci-
ary duty in the private equity industry. The vagueness of the 
term fiduciary was best expounded on by Justice Frankfurter: 
“But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it 
gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? 
What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect 
has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty?”138 Yet, against this 
backdrop, the SEC has attempted to apply standards of fidu-
ciary duty developed outside of the private equity industry 
without taking account of differences in the sophistication or 
bargaining power of the respective parties. Taking lessons 
from the contractarian approach and allowing the modifica-
tion or waiver of fiduciary duties would allow the SEC to po-
lice the industry in a way that takes into account the business 
realities of private equity. Unique incentive structures may 
exist, yet the current enforcement regime has not taken this 
possibility into account. This Note’s prescriptions offer the 
possibility of enforcement that is more accurate and realistic, 
garnering respect from the industry and a realistic way to deal 
with regulation of private equity post Dodd-Frank. 
 
138 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943). 
